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Abstract 
 
This study has been analyzedrelationship 
between corporate governanceand BOD 
(board of directors) characteristics on financial 
statements and auditor change in future 
financialperiod. In this study, auditor tenure 
criterion and auditor change has been used as a 
basis for measuring audit quality and 
ownershipconcentration and lack of 
manager’sinfluence on the board variables has 
been consideredas indicators to measure the 
strength and weaknessof corporate 
governance. variables used in this study has 
been calculated the financial reports of listed 
companies in Tehran Stock Exchange in the 
period 2005-2015 (the eventperiod) with the 
software Excel 2016 and 86 companies data 
during 2008 -2015 (the review) using  Eviews 
six econometricsoftware and panel data 
estimation method inregression models of 
bainary logit has been analyzed. Research 
results show that significant relationship was 
not observed in the first hypothesis test 
between ownership concentrationand selected 
audit institution in terma of audit quality. 
Also,significant relationship was not observed 
in the fourth hypothesis between ownership 
concentrationand the restated financial 
 Abstract 
 
En este estudio se analizó la relación entre el 
gobierno corporativo y las características de la 
DBO (junta directiva) en los estados financieros 
y el cambio en el auditor en el período financiero 
futuro. En este estudio, el criterio de tenencia del 
auditor y el cambio del auditor se han utilizado 
como base para medir la calidad de la auditoría y 
la concentración de propiedad y la falta de 
influencia del gerente en las variables del consejo 
ha sido considerada como indicadores para 
medir la fortaleza y debilidad del gobierno 
corporativo. Las variables utilizadas en este 
estudio se han calculado los informes financieros 
de las empresas cotizadas en la Bolsa de Teherán 
en el período 2005-2015 (el período del evento) 
con el software Excel 2016 y 86 empresas de 
datos durante 2008 -2015 (la revisión) utilizando 
Eviews six econometricsoftware y Se ha 
analizado el método de estimación de datos del 
panel en modelos de regresión del logit bainario. 
Los resultados de la investigación muestran que 
no se observó una relación significativa en la 
primera prueba de hipótesis entre la 
concentración de la propiedad y la institución de 
auditoría seleccionada en términos de la calidad 
de la auditoría. Asimismo, no se observó una 
relación significativa en la cuarta hipótesis entre 
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statements in the next year. But positive and 
significant relationship wasobserved in the 
second hypothesis, between the lack of 
manager’sinfluence and selected audit 
institutionin terms of audit quality was 
observed. In the third and fifth 
hypothesizesrespectivelythere was a negative 
and significant relationshipbetween auditor 
select with high quality and the lack of 
managers influence with the variable ofrestated 
financial statements in the next year. And in the 
sixth hypothesis positiveand significant 
relationship was observed between auditor 
change in the restated yearand restatement of 
financial statements. 
 
Keywords: Restatement of Financial 
Statements, Ownership Concentration, Influence 
Managers, auditor Change, Auditor Select, 
Corporate Governance. 
la concentración de la propiedad y los estados 
financieros actualizados en el año siguiente. Pero 
se observó una relación positiva y significativa en 
la segunda hipótesis, entre la falta de influencia 
del gerente y la institución de auditoría 
seleccionada en términos de la calidad de la 
auditoría. En la tercera y quinta hipótesis, 
respectivamente, hubo una relación negativa y 
significativa entre el auditor seleccionado con alta 
calidad y la falta de influencia de los gerentes con 
la variable de los estados financieros 
reexpresados en el próximo año. Y en la sexta 
hipótesis, se observó una relación positiva e 
importante entre el cambio del auditor en el año 
reexpresado y la reexpresión de los estados 
financieros. 
 
Palabras clave: reformulación de Estados 
Financieros, Concentración de Propiedad, 
Gerentes de Influencia, Cambio de auditor, 
Selección de Auditor, Gobierno Corporativo. 
Resumo 
 
Este estudo analisou a relação entre a governança corporativa e as características do CA (conselho de 
administração) sobre as demonstrações contábeis e a mudança do auditor no futuro período financeiro. 
Neste estudo, o critério de propriedade do auditor e a mudança de auditor foram usados como base para 
medir a qualidade da auditoria e a concentração da propriedade e a falta de influência do gestor nas variáveis 
do conselho foi considerada como um indicador para medir a força e a fraqueza da governança corporativa. 
variáveis utilizadas neste estudo foram calculados os relatórios financeiros das empresas listadas na Bolsa 
de Valores de Teerã no período 2005-2015 (o período do evento) com o software Excel 2016 e 86 
empresas dados durante 2008 -2015 (a revisão) usando Eviews seis econometria software e O método de 
estimação de dados em painel foi analisado em modelos de regressão de bainary logit. Os resultados da 
pesquisa mostram que não foi observada relação significativa no primeiro teste de hipótese entre a 
concentração de propriedade e a instituição de auditoria selecionada em termos de qualidade de auditoria. 
Além disso, relação significativa não foi observada na quarta hipótese entre a concentração da propriedade 
e as demonstrações financeiras reapresentadas no ano seguinte. Porém, foi observada relação positiva e 
significativa na segunda hipótese, entre a falta de influência do gestor e a instituição de auditoria selecionada 
em termos de qualidade de auditoria. Na terceira e quinta hipóteses, respectivamente, houve uma relação 
negativa e significativa entre seleção de auditor com alta qualidade e a falta de influência dos gestores com 
a variável das demonstrações financeiras no exercício seguinte. E na sexta hipótese positiva e relação 
significativa foi observada entre a mudança de auditor no ano de reexame e reapresentação das 
demonstrações financeiras. 
 
Palavras-chave: Reformulação de Demonstrações Financeiras, Concentração de Propriedade, 
Gerentes de Influência, Mudança de Auditor, Auditor Select, Governança Corporativa. 
 
Introducción 
 
In recent years, restatement of financial 
statements is very popular among Iranian 
companies so that the annual adjustment is 
mentioned as one of relatively stable 
accumulated profit and loss elements in account 
circulation. These adjustments are mainly due to 
the errorscorrection ofpriorperiod and cases 
related to changes of accounting methodsare less 
visible. On the other handrestatement of 
financial statements has effect on the ability 
ofreliable and trustpotency to figures presented 
in the financial statements especially profitfigure. 
One of the main features of qualitative 
accounting information is itsreliability. Alsobased 
on theoretical concepts of financial, 
informationreporting is reliable that is empty of 
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biasedtendencies. The researches has done 
earlier in Iran shows that a high percentage of 
companies in Iran due to the correction of 
accounting errors, restatefinancial statements 
and the annual figure is reported under the title 
of adjustments, indicate this matter is cause 
ofdoubt in firms accounting informationin terms 
of free from false feature. (Kurdistan, et al, 1389).  
So the annual adjustments andrestatement of 
financial statements inprior periods, there are 
numerous negative consequences.The net profit 
figure isbaseof calculationoncases such as Board 
reward, taxes andprofit dividend to 
shareholders. In addition, per share profit and 
ratio of price to per share profit are the 
indicatorsthat be used by analysts and investors. 
Thus, providing improperprofit and modifying it 
in next periods, that means aftertaking related 
decisions, economic and financial effects will be 
different for individuals (Aliza, Rosenstein, 2011). 
 
Another negative consequences of the annual 
adjustments is its impact on the credibility of 
auditors. The audit purpose is validatingto 
financial statements and when the audited 
financial statements in prior periods 
berestatedfor many timesdue to significant 
errorsof accounting, society trust to the auditor's 
opinion bereduced (Abbott, L., S. Parker and G. 
Peters 2005).To understand the possible 
motivations of firms management about 
providing wrong accounting figures and correct 
it for future periods should be noted that justified 
such action. Conductedresearchesin fraudulently 
reporting fieldhave enumerated different 
motivations for such actions. Naturally, It should 
be remembered that restatementoffinancial 
statements is not always an indication of fraud 
and will be put in the range of inadvertent error 
correction not in fraudulentlyreporting, but 
could be used simply as a cover for management 
fraudulently behaviors (Srinivasan, S. 2005).  
 
Some researchers with assumptionthat 
restatementof financial statementsrootedin 
common motivations, argue these motivations 
can findapparent form andmanifest itself in 
thefeatures and financial, economic information 
of these firms. Thus, with realizing these 
common features, predict possibility of 
restatement of financial statements will be 
provided. A review in the researches has already 
been done in the field of restatement of financial 
statements, can be useful to understand these 
useful factors. 
 
The discussions that mentioned here will be 
looking to show why financial statements did 
restate in several financial periods? 
Whethercorporate governance employs auditors 
with higherquality tosurveillance on firms and 
itscontroversial role? That depends onprofit cost 
related to the owners control is performed. 
These benefits and profitsmay be able to 
increase marketbudgetinusing the 
firmexaminationwith higher quality and with 
minimal cost ofshare selling at higher market 
prices are equal. 
 
Some studies have documented as 
experimental formthat a commercial firm with 
weak corporate governance or aggressive 
management of earning has the higher possibility 
in combining the position of CEO and Board and 
thisissue has relation with restatement of 
financial statementsin the next period. 
 
Priorconducted studies on the selection of 
audittook placein United States significantly 
andoccasional studies in countries like Australia 
andEngland that in terms of audit circumstances 
are almost similar. One reason for 
auditmarketsinvestigation extensively in these 
countries is having developed capital in these 
countries. However, less empirical studies has 
been conducted aboutdecisions related to the 
auditorchoice in emerging economies despite a 
significant effect on financial reporting and capital 
market operations. 
 
Emerging economies that have 
lowerdevelopment, in terms of audit 
environment is very different in compared with 
developed countries (and Fan and Wong, 2005& 
Woodward, 1997). 
 
The prevailing thought is that the board of 
firms (Corporate Governance) play more 
decisive role for firms in the economicinstability 
situation. In this research, the effects of 
corporate governance criteria inside and outside 
the firm (independentfrom the firm) will be 
examinedon restatement of financialstatements 
of listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. 
 
The objectives andthe researchproblem 
 
Thisresearch will examinegovernance 
structures issue in two dimensions: (a) 
ownership concentration structure or 
dispersedconsideredmany owners existencewith 
a less share and also (b) the composition and the 
number of board members to segregation of 
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duties have an important role in the manner of 
electing an independent auditor and directly 
following restatement of financial statements 
reasons of listed companies in TehranStock 
Exchange. 
 
Thus, according to the anticipation of some 
reasons in theprevious literature, how to choose 
audit byconstituent members of corporate 
governance, which is one of the major reasons of 
restatement of financial statements will examine 
it from the perspective of audit quality. On the 
other hand relationship between the annual 
adjustments and changes in accumulatedprofit 
and lossin the creation (established) year is 
tested in terms of being weak or strong by 
dominant guideline structure oncompanies.The 
present research aimed examination of this 
issuethat how important is restatement of 
accounting financial statements as for strong or 
weak corporate governance mechanisms for the 
owners of shares in listed companiesin Tehran 
Stock Exchange?The researcher according to the 
research resultsintendto lead potential and de 
facto investorsto invest in companies that 
reliability of their financial statements due to 
strong corporate governance and selectionhigh-
quality auditwhich lead to the stability of financial 
statements and lack of restatement of financial 
statements in the next year. 
 
Importance of the issue 
 
Undoubtedly, the emergence of joint stock 
companiesin the industrialized world that began 
since18 century is regardedthe largest economic 
evolutions and perhaps most important industrial 
progress factor. One of the consequences of this 
phenomenon is the separation of ownership 
from management, existence ofnatural 
differences in their utility function and in 
resultforming interest conflict and after that 
creation representative - owner relationship and 
theory of agency (Cyert, R., S. Kang and P. 
Kumar 2002).Separation of ownershipfrom 
management can be led opportunistic behaviors 
of management and increasing problems in the 
institutions. To ensure that management is 
accomplished according to the interests of 
owners, including the management of external 
supervisions by independent auditors, the 
contract planning must be set between the 
owner (representative)and management 
(institution). Therefore, independent auditors 
play fundamental role in 
confidenceconsolidationtoward financial reports 
toreduce agency costs and reduce restatement 
of  importantfinancial statements cases with 
respect to management's discretion for future 
financial periods. In addition, the audited financial 
information are used to distinguish between 
commercial institutions with different viewpoints 
(Klein, A. 2002).The discussions areposedhere 
shows why firms recruit high quality auditors for 
supervision their performance and selection of  
high quality auditor by a company with strong 
corporate governancehas what impact on the 
reliability of financial statements. 
Conductedstudies indicate that the demand to 
usehighquality auditors hasinverse 
relationshipwith concentrated ownership in 
companies.Despite concentrated ownership 
structure and weakening of internal supervision 
of the company, the board tendency faced with 
ambiguity to use auditors withquality (DeFond, 
M., R. Hann and X. Hu 2005).According to the 
introduction in present research, we are looking 
for examination of theirlationship between 
variables in the research and examination of the 
effect of each of them on each other. So, 
wedefine the main meddlesomevariables in the 
present research as follows:When shareholders 
want to rely on financial information of external 
auditors do play an important role in corporate 
strategyand they are as an important means of 
monitoring the financial reporting process and 
independent investigation are an important 
component in the strategy of the 
company.Therefore, there is a relation between 
strong corporate governance and credibility of 
financial reportingand thiscredibility is achieved 
by implementation a high quality audit. It has 
been argued that concentrated ownership is a 
weakness in corporate governanceandprobably 
display the financial reporting of the companies 
non-transparent. So the companies that are 
faced with concentrated ownershipshow more 
enthusiasmto choose a lower quality auditors. 
They can simply maintain private and personal 
interests underlower levels of assessment and 
control of audit and in the coming years forthe 
lastfinancial interests they proceed to record the 
annual adjustments and account change of 
accumulated profit and loss. On the other hand, 
under the corporate governance structure, the 
board be formed to ensure that management 
activity is towardinterests of shareholders, but 
some members of the board has two 
responsibilitiessimultaneously (including the 
duality ofCEO and also board member) 
consequently, these cases will be faced with less 
monitoring and evaluation in management and it 
is indicator of corporate governance weakness 
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(Marciukaityte, Dalia, S. Scewczyk, and R. Varma 
2009). 
 
Some empirical studies indicate that a 
commercial entity with weakcorporate 
governance controlling or dominantmanagement 
of earning gain, has morepossibility in CEO 
combination and Board positions. In this case, 
these companies intend to use the audit 
institutionswith lower quality (Bebchuk, L., A. 
Cohen and A. Ferrell 2005). 
 
About theboards that following the 
controlled structure, separating the position of 
CEO with Chairman of the Board in connection 
with positive impact of the company internal 
supervisionand its mechanism is a 
necessaryaction (Baysinger, B. and H. Butler 
1995). 
 
For this reason, this research examine 
governance structuresissuein two dimensions: 
(a) ownership concentration structure or 
dispersed (existenceof many owners 
witlessshare) and also (b) the composition and 
the number of the board members for separation 
of duties has an important role in the way of 
independent auditor choice. And 
followingexamination of restatement of financial 
statements reasons of listed companiesin Tehran 
Stock Exchange directly. Therefore,according to 
the anticipation of some reasons in previous 
literature, it is examined the perspective of audit 
quality, how to choose auditor by the constituent 
members of corporate governance which is one 
of the major reasons of restatement of financial 
statements. 
 
On the other hand, the relation between the 
annual adjustments and accumulatedprofit and 
loss account change in established year is tested 
by dominant guidelinestructure on companies in 
terms ofbeing weak or strong. 
 
Research background 
 
External background 
 
Anderson and et al (2011) reported that the 
companies tendencyreduced to choosehigher 
quality audit withfurther assets return ratio and 
further potential growth. 
 
Christine I. W, Kevin B. H,(2010)by using 
accruals scale as a scale of profit quality, showed 
that quality of financial reportingwas increased 
from the distortionperiod ( before restatement ) 
till afterrestatementperiod. 
 
(Ettredege, M., y, Huang. W, zhang, 2010) 
also choose profit conservatism as a scale of 
profit quality and showed that companies which 
have restatement, conservatism was increased in 
the period after restatement. 
 
Kevin,W.Hee,(2008 )also in his study 
selected profit stability as a scale of profit quality 
and showed that restatedprofitshas more 
stability than the reported preliminary profits 
inthe restatement year and as well as next period 
of  restatement. 
 
On the other hand Francis, Jennifer, D. 
Nanda, and P. Olsson. (2008) found that 
companies with idealisticprofit quality have 
moreoptionaldisclosures compared 
tocompanieswithweak profitquality. They 
suggest that as the information quality of 
company improved, managersdo 
moreoptionaldisclosure. 
 
Sandeep N., Yangtze K. William G (2007) 
byusing a sample of companies which have 
profitrestatement in the years 1997 to 2003 
found that occurrence probability of optional 
restatement has a positive relationship 
withindependence of the Board members and 
audit committee. 
 
Robin N. Romanus. (2007) believed that 
restatements reduced investors' beliefs 
accuracyabout information, because there is 
arisk that financialinformationbe based on 
previous beliefs that are not valid. Restatement is 
a sign for investors thatmanagers are invalid and 
the financial, generalinformation provided by the 
managers is less reliable. Also, there is probability 
thatmanagers have had jurisdiction over 
opportunistic accounting choices. 
 
Lobo, Gerald, and J. Zhou. (2006) ina study 
examined whether SOX Act effected on the 
pattern of mandatory or optionalrestatement of 
profit. They showed that mandatory 
restatements bySEC and other external 
institutions has decreased about 20 percentafter 
SOX Act compared to earlierbyuseing315 
companies data for the period from 1997 to 
2005. This research also examined discretionary 
accruals amount in the periods before and after 
this Act andthe results showed a significant 
decreasehas occurredin the share of 
discretionary accruals after the SOX Act. 
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Altamuro, J., A. Beatty and J. Weber (2005) in 
their study showed that companies with high 
ownership(low of majority shareholders 
number) more inclined that choose a flexible 
auditor so that they can easily earn personal 
profits under weak supervision of the auditor. In 
addition, high-ownershipcreatedexclusive 
situation and it is causeddominance 
indetermination of the Board, senior executives 
and prevention from minority shareholders 
interference in operational decision-making, 
including auditorchoice. Thus, a company with 
high ownership more likelychoose low quality 
auditors for capitalizing and smoothing the 
created profits caused by weak governance. 
Boardseparation is a necessity on the 
effectiveness of internal mechanism of corporate 
governance and studies indicate that a company 
with weak corporate governanceor aggressive 
earnings management of managers is more likely 
tend to combineCEO and chairman of the board. 
 
Internal background 
 
Nikbakht and lofty, (1391) study of financial 
statements of listed companies in Tehran Stock 
Exchange shows that the financial statements of 
some companies has the annual financial 
adjustments. Some studies show that 85 percent 
of financial statements of listed companies 
inTehran Stock Exchange has annual 
adjustments. Whereas, according to the 
Commission ofAmerican Stock Exchange, only 
about 9 percent of the listed companies on US 
exchange in2006 restated their financial 
statements and this amount was mentioned as a 
concern. 
 
Kordestani and others (1389) in research 
with title of empirical test on annual adjustments 
in capital market found that the annual 
adjustmentsnumbers more than importance 
levelinfinancial statements level of the previous 
financial period. As a result, the awareness of 
financial statementsusersfromeffects related to 
theprevious annual adjustments can be effective 
on their decision-making and existence of the 
annual adjustments in the financial statements 
can be a sign of insufficient reliability of the 
financial statements. 
 
Ghasem. Bulue and others (1389) in 
researchwith title of independent auditor change 
andinformation clarity concluded that the auditor 
change be not caused to increasing in annual 
adjustments mean of the 
companiesinchangingyearcompared to 
yearbeforechanging. Therefore, they reached 
the lack of improvement inannual adjustments 
after changing independent auditor of the 
company. 
 
It is necessary to mentioning they also 
realized decrease in the annual adjustments 
meanwith regard to the comparison of changing 
annual adjustmentsmean in changing year and the 
year before changing compared to the two years 
before changing that can be lack ofauditor 
effortindicator in order to better disclosure of 
employer's financial information in the final year 
of his tenure. 
 
Ghorbani (1389) examined the effect 
ofauditor choosecontinuityaudit quality in listed 
companiesin Stock Exchange. In this study 
related data of72 companies withcombination 
form inthe period from1382 to 1388 have been 
analyzedby using the pooled regression system. 
The results of the hypothesis test showed that 
auditor choosecontinuityhas no significant effect 
on audit quality. 
 
Zaire (1389) examined the relationship 
betweenanticipatedprofit errors by management 
and corporate governance structure in listed 
companiesinTehranStock Exchange. In this 
study, the relationship betweenanticipatedprofit 
errors by management and corporate 
governance structure in listed companies’in 
Tehran Stock Exchange has been examined. 
 
BagheriNoobar (1389) studied examination 
of the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the amount of 
wealth created for shareholders. This study was 
carried out to provide evidencerelated to the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on 
the amount of wealth created forshareholders. 
 
Chalaki (1389) introduced a model for the 
relationship between corporate governance, 
earnings management and information content 
of profit in listed company’sinTehranStock 
Exchange. 
 
KhosroNejad(1388) examined the 
relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms, debt ratio and firm size with 
earnings management. In this studysome 
corporate governance mechanismswas 
examined in the capital market in Iran 
andexistenceof the possible relationship 
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between these mechanisms, ofdebtsratioand 
firm size with earnings managementwas studied. 
 
Dadashi(1388) examined the effect of 
corporate governance on the auditor's decisions 
about risk and planning. This study was 
examinedthe effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms on independent auditor's decisions. 
The purpose of this study has been the effect of 
governance mechanisms determination such as 
the company board structure, internal Audit 
(internal supervision mechanisms of corporate 
governance) major shareholder and institutional 
investors (external supervision mechanisms of 
corporate governance) on the decisions 
andplanning’s of independent auditors such as 
evaluation of inherent risk, control risk, the 
amount and timing of the content tests. 
 
Statistical population and statistical sample 
 
The statistical population was including the listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange during eight 
years period 1385-1392 by consideringthe following characteristics: 
 
A. The company name has been included inlisted companies inStock Exchange on 1380/12/29.  
B. Its fiscal year endsinEsfand 29th. 
D. The company has not changed its fiscal year through the period of study. 
E. Not be one of the financial intermediation companies including banks, investment companies and 
holding. Because investment and financial intermediation companiespay less through discretionary accruals 
to earnings management. 
C. Explanatory notes of the financial statements beaccessible. 
H. Be one of theactive companies in pharmaceutical, food and sugar cube and sugarindustry. 
To test the hypothesis, Spearman univariate regression model and binary logit multivariate regression 
being used in balanced panel estimation method. In this study, purposefully non-probability sampling has 
been used to select sampling method. 
 
The research hypotheses 
 
First hypothesis: between ownership concentrations and in terms of quality the selected audit firm 
Audit and significant negative relationship exists irrigation. The second hypothesis: between lack of 
influence of the Institute of Directors and chosen audit for audit quality and significant positive relationship 
exists irrigation.The third hypothesis: between high-quality auditor and financial statements restatements 
in the following year there is a significant negative relationship. 
Fourth hypothesis: betweenownershipconcentration and financial statements restatements in the 
following year there is a significant and positive relationship. 
Fifth hypothesis: between lack of managers influence and restatements of financial statements in the 
following year there is a significant negative relationship. 
Sixth hypothesis: The change in auditor and financial statements restatements there is a significant 
positive relationship. 
 
Research variables 
Research variables are as follow table: 
 
Variables Description 
RESTATE 1 If the company restateits financial statements and 0 for otherwise 
External Governance 
AUD  1 if the company is audited by high quality auditors and 0 for otherwise (criterion of audit quality 
tenure have been considered 5 years) 
BLOCK The number of block owners and major shareholders outside of the company (variable indicates 
ownership concentration, ownership more than 15%) 
d CharacteristicsBoar and Internal Governance 
BOD_INDEP  The number of non-bound members (Independent) in board 
BOD_SIZE  The number of board members 
SEP_CHAIR  1 If CEO was not Chairman of the Board and 0for otherwise (variable indicates managers 
influence) 
Control Variables 
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CH_AUD 1 if the company's auditor changes in the year that financial statements has been restated, and 0 for 
otherwise (dummy variable to observe the auditor) 
GROWTH The rate of growth, sales growth during the past two years used in examination year 
FREECF Free cash flow at the beginning of the year 
DIV_YIELD Dividend returns at the beginning of the year 
MARGIN Net profit at the beginning of the year divided to the sales 
LEVERAGE Financial leverage. Total debtsdivided to the total assets 
Descriptive statistics  
Descriptive Statistics of the total sample companies 
 
Researcher provides detailed descriptive statistics, because rarely information about the size of auditor 
tenure and governance informationof the companiesand their effect on the restatement of financial 
statements listed in Tehran Stock Exchange.Report of descriptive statistics about the companyfeatures for 
the total sample in Table 1-4 shows the value mean RESTATE reflectsthe restatement of financial 
statements variable (.,339181) and median is (0,0000). 
 
(AUD)high quality auditors (with2 years tenurecriterion) are 38, 88% in sample companies audit. 
The value mean (BLOCK) reflects the ownership concentration in the companies (0, 534025) and its 
medianis (0, 5247). 
 
The value mean (SEPCHAIR) reflectslack of manager’s influence in companies (0, 614035) and its 
median is (1,000). 
 
The value mean (BODINDEP) reflects the number of non –bound members of the boards (2, 084795) 
and its median is (3,000). 
 
 The value mean (BODSIZE) reflectslack of manager’s influence in companies (5, 845029)and its median 
is (6,000). 
 
The value mean (CHAUD) reflects the firms which have changed their audit institutions in the 
restatement of financial statements (0, 230994) and its median is (0,000). 
 
Various functions and their measuring (like DIVYIELD, FREECF, GROWCH, LEVERAGE, AND 
MARGIN)shows the studied sample companies in terms of financially are healthy. 
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Also the results of descriptive statistics examination in 1-4 table show that BLOCK haslow standard deviation(0,201971)which cause of this can be high fluctuations in 
changing of the number of block owners and major shareholders outside of the company (variable indicates ownership concentration, ownership more than 15%)which is 
effected it. Also the elongation coefficient of high quality auditors (criterion of audit quality tenure have been considered 5 years) AUD (1,207792) is low compared to other 
variables, that indicate tenure of audit institutions had less unusual changes in the studied population compared to other variables. Also inthe studied sample 38, 88 % of 
the company have chosen high quality auditor (with 5 yearstenure criterion). 
 
  AUD BLOCK BODINDEP BODSIZE SEPCHAIR CHAUD DIVYIELD FREECF GROWCH LEVERAGE MARGIN RESTATE 
 Mean 0.388889 0.534025 2.084795 5.845029 0.614035 0.230994 6.38299 -262101 0.255175 0.679813 16.18137 0.339181 
 Median 0 0.5247 3 6 1 0 2.988684 -78618.5 0.169316 0.661325 13.66849 0 
 Maximum 1 0.915 8 11 1 1 175.3968 302838 9.212938 3.760074 198.9644 1 
 Minimum 0 0.033 0 5 0 0 0 -1.3E+07 -0.927502 0.01796 -105.45 0 
 Std. Dev. 0.488212 0.201971 1.664306 0.549024 0.487536 0.422086 12.7361 809606.8 0.670876 0.280939 24.11907 0.474125 
Skewness 0.455842 -0.17174 -0.100329 2.059632 -0.468487 1.276516 8.3574 -11.8443 9.025258 5.134722 1.16402 0.679375 
 Kurtosis 1.207792 2.612224 1.8445 24.85868 1.219481 2.629494 100.3007 181.1482 110.789 52.31922 19.26387 1.46155 
  
           
  
Jarque-Bera 57.61528 3.82402 19.60009 7050.473 57.68645 94.83733 138892 460245.4 170206.3 36164.32 3846.548 60.03566 
 Probability 0 0.147783 0.000055 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
           
  
 Sum 133 182.6365 713 1999 210 79 2182.983 -9E+07 87.26975 232.496 5534.028 116 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 81.27778 13.91023 944.5409 102.7865 81.05263 60.75146 55313.05 2.24E+14 153.4753 26.91398 198369.7 76.65497 
  
           
  
 Observations 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 
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Univariate correlation  
 
The correlation coefficient shows intensity of relationshipas well askind of relationship (direct or 
inverse) and itis square root ofdetermination coefficient. Therefore the correlation coefficient can be 
positive or negative, and always it is between 1 and -1. Spearmancorrelation (oblique up) reportsresearch 
variablesfor the total samplesin table 3-4.According to the figures reflected in the table, the numbers 
undersignificant column (p-value) indicate possibility of each coefficient beequal zero. To be significant 
ofcoefficient, this possibility amount be compared with desired significant level(here 0, 05) is sufficient.If 
this probability is less than the significant level of 0, 05it can be concluded that the coefficient is significant. 
 
Negative and significant correlation is observed between the restatement of financial statements 
RESTATE and audit quality AUD (-1, 43189*) (t=0, 0531). This issuesupports third hypothesis. Significant 
correlation is not found between restatement of financial statements RESTATE and ownership 
concentration. 
 
BLOCK (0, 584041) (t =0, 5596). This issuedoes not support fourth hypothesis.Negative and significant 
correlation is observed between the restatement of financial statements RESTATE and lack of managers 
influence SEPCHAIR (-0, 990498*)(t =0, 0226). This issuesupports fifth hypothesis. Positiveand significant 
correlation is observed between the restatement of financial statements RESTATE and auditor change in 
restatement of financial statements year CHAUD (0, 325559*) (t =0,045). This issuesupports sixth 
hypothesis.In addition, significant correlation is not observed between the restatement of financial 
statements RESTATE andnon-bound members in the board BODINDEP (0, 535278) (t =0, 
5928).Significant correlation is not observed between the restatement of financial statements RESTATE 
and size of the board BODSIZE (-0, 663048) (t =0, 5077). Significant correlation is not observed between 
the restatement of financial statements RESTATE and divided yield at the beginning of the yearDIVYIELD 
(1, 766037) (t =0, 0783).(Of course, it is nearly significant) 
 
Negative and significant correlation is observed between the restatement of financial statements 
RESTATE and free cash flow at the beginning of  the year FREECF (-2,36607*) (t =0,0185). Significant 
correlation is not observed between the restatement of financial statements RESTATEand the rate ofsales 
growth in the past two years GROWCH (0, 961026) (t =0, 3372). 
 
Significant correlation is not observed between the restatement of financial statements RESTATE and 
the degree of financial leverage (-0, 440191) (t =0, 6601). Significant correlation is not observed between 
the restatement of financial statements RESTATE and net profit at the beginning of the year MARGIN (1, 
441313) (t = 0, 1498) 
 
Negative and significant correlation is observed between the restatement of financial statements 
RESTATE and audit quality AUD (-1, 43189*) (t =0, 0531).This issuesupports third hypothesis. Positive 
and significant correlation is observed between lack of managers influence SEPCHAIR and audit quality 
AUD  (3, 308293*) (t = 0,001). This issue supports second hypothesis. 
 
Negative and significant correlation is observed between auditor change in restatement of financial 
statements year CHAUD andaudit quality AUD (-8, 60718*) (t =0,000).Significant correlation is not found 
between the audit quality AUD (auditor tenure) and ownership concentration BLOCK (-0, 01457)(t=0, 
9884). This issuedoes not support first hypothesis. Furthermore, significant correlation is not observed 
between non-bound members in the board BODINDEP and audit quality AUD (-0, 85666) (t =0, 3922). 
).Significant correlation is not observed between size of the board BODSIZE and audit quality AUD (0, 
608409) (t=0, 5433). 
 
Significant correlation is not observed between divided yield at the beginning of the yearDIVYIELD and 
audit quality AUD (1, 875976) (t =0, 0615)(Of course, it is nearly significant). Significant correlation is not 
observed between free cash flow at the beginning of the year FREECFand audit quality AUD (1, 64201) 
(t=0, 1015). Significant correlation is not observed between the rate of sales growth in the past two years 
GROWCH and audit qualityAUD (-0, 22462) (t =0, 8224). Significant correlation is not observed between 
the degree of financial leverage LEVERAGE and audit quality AUD (1, 231067)(t =0, 2191). Significant 
correlation is not observed between the net profit at the beginning of the year MARGIN and audit quality 
AUD (-0, 91355) (t = 0, 3616). This is possible because a large percentage of the studied statistical 
population companies have audited by institutions thattheir tenure was less than 5 years. 
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Table 3-4 Spearman correlation matrix,research variables in the total sampleand significant level 
(334observed, company –year). 
 
Covariance Analysis: Spearman rank-order Date: 08/25/15   Time: 19:29 Sample: 1385 1392 Included observations: 342 
  
  
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion) 
       
  
t-Statistic 
           
  
Probability AUD BLOCK BODINDEP BODSIZE SEPCHAIR CHAUD DIVYIELD FREECF GROWCH LEVERAGE MARGIN RESTATE 
AUD  ----- 
           
BLOCK  -0.01457 ----- 
          
  0.9884 ----- 
          
BODINDEP  -0.85666 *-3.75085 ----- 
         
  0.3922 0.0002 ----- 
         
BODSIZE  0.608409 *-4.40033 -1.793035 ----- 
        
  0.5433 0 0.0739 ----- 
        
SEPCHAIR  *3.308239 0.378166 *3.837784 *12.32758 ----- 
       
  0.001 0.7055 0.0001 0 ----- 
       
CHAUD  *-8.60718 -0.2767 0.800541 -0.262073 *-1.984482 ----- 
      
  0 0.7822 0.424 0.7934 0.048 ----- 
      
DIVYIELD  1.875976 0.150346 -0.368621 *2.450241 *2.239193 -0.34408 ----- 
     
  0.0615 0.8806 0.7126 0.0148 0.0258 0.731 ----- 
     
FREECF  1.64201 -1.02165 -0.105247 *-1.916127 -1.797164 -1.00373 *-6.12555 ----- 
    
  0.1015 0.3077 0.9162 0.0562 0.0732 0.3162 0 ----- 
    
GROWCH  -0.22462 1.453158 0.997479 *-1.974856 0.041506 -0.58986 -1.57246 0.228787 ----- 
   
  0.8224 0.1471 0.3192 0.0491 0.9669 0.5557 0.1168 0.8192 ----- 
   
LEVERAGE  1.231067 *6.481726 -0.266467 *-3.230437 0.517908 0.269541 *-5.9459 -0.50534 -0.813746 ----- 
  
  0.2191 0 0.79 0.0014 0.6049 0.7877 0 0.6136 0.4164 ----- 
  
MARGIN  -0.91355 -0.42464 0.96295 *3.824578 *4.343136 -0.00454 *7.651382 *-2.81668 *1.953506 *-11.26439 ----- 
 
  0.3616 0.6714 0.3363 0.0002 0 0.9964 0 0.0051 0.0516 0 ----- 
 
RESTATE  *-1.43189 0.584041 0.535278 -0.663048 *-0.990498 *0.325559 1.766037 *-2.36607 0.961026 -0.440191 1.443413 ----- 
  0.0531 0.5596 0.5928 0.5077 0.0226 0.045 0.0783 0.0185 0.3372 0.6601 0.1498 ----- 
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Hypotheses test and analyze the findings  
The first hypothesis test  
 
Statistical significant correlationwas not found between ownership concentration and selectedaudit 
institutionin terms of audit quality AUD and BLOCK inthe whole population. (Y1 = -0,619306), (t = 
0,3901) sothe hypothesis H0,1is confirmed in %95  significance level or with %5 error andthe hypothesis 
H1,1is rejected. Therefore, it can be said:there is nonegative and significantrelationship between ownership 
concentration and selected audit institutionin terms of audit quality. 
 
The second hypothesis test 
 
Statistical positive andsignificant correlationwas found between the lack of manager’sinfluence 
andselectedaudit institutionin terms of quality audit AUD and SEPCHAIR in the whole population. (Y9 
=1,190113), (t = 0,0034)sothe hypothesis H1,2is confirmed in %95  significance level or with %5 error 
andthe hypothesis H0,2is rejected. The relationship type is positivetherefore,it can be said:there is positive 
and significantrelationship betweenlack of manager’s influence and selectedaudit institutionin terms of 
quality audit. 
 
Table 5-4: The relationship between ownership concentration andlack of manager’s influence by 
selecting theaudit institutionin terms of quality in the whole population 
 
Dependent Variable: AUD       
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing)   
Date: 08/25/15   Time: 19:21 
  
  
Sample: 1385 1392 
   
  
Included observations: 342 
  
  
Convergence achieved after 10 iterations 
 
  
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
  
   
  
BLOCK -0.619306 0.720533 -0.85951 0.3901 
BODINDEP -0.136381 0.094242 -1.44714 0.1479 
BODSIZE -0.37818 0.530779 -0.7125 0.4762 
DIVYIELD 0.025095 0.014688 1.708526 0.0875 
FREECF *2.84E-07 1.50E-07 1.888236 0.059 
GROWCH 0.128108 0.186628 0.686435 0.4924 
LEVERAGE -0.41193 0.581212 -0.70874 0.4785 
MARGIN *-0.017235 0.006492 -2.65477 0.0079 
SEPCHAIR *1.190113 0.406325 2.928971 0.0034 
C 2.05042 3.293877 0.622494 0.5336 
  
   
  
McFadden R-squared 0.057267     Mean dependent var 0.38889 
S.D. dependent var 0.488212     S.E. of regression 0.47588 
Akaike info criterion 1.318439     Sum squared resid 75.1864 
Schwarz criterion 1.430568     Log likelihood -215.45 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.363108 Restr. log likelihood -228.54 
LR statistic 26.1759     Avg. log likelihood -0.63 
Prob(LR statistic) 0.001912 
  
  
  
   
  
Obs with Dep=0 209      Total obs 
 
342 
Obs with Dep=1 133 
  
  
 
Among other control variables,statistical positive and significant correlation is found between free cash 
flow FREECF and audit quality AUD in the whole population. (Y5 = 2, 84E-07), (t = 0,059) also,statistical 
negative and significant correlation is found between the net profit at the beginning of the yeardivided to 
sales MARGIN and audit quality AUD in the whole population. (Y5 = -0, 017235), (t =0, 0079). 
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Based on the coefficients of the variables in Table 5-4 AUD can be written as follows: 
 
That, it is indicatorof the relationship between measurement parameters effect of lack of 
managersinfluence and ownership concentration on the auditorchoice in terms of quality(with 5years 
tenure criterion) in companiesby using the following LOGIT regression model: 
 
AUD it = −0.619306BLOCKit − 0.136381BODINDEPit − 0.37818BODSIZEit + 0.025095DIVYIELDit
+ 2.84E − 07FREECFit + 0.128108GROWCHit − 0.41193LEVERAGEit
− 0.017235MARGINit + 1.190113SEPCHAIRit + 2.05042C 
 
The results of the regression is reliable when the fitted regression is significant totally. McFadden’s 
determinationis used to significant of theregression whichin accordance with table 5-4data model of 
McFadden coefficient is 0,057267, so it can be said goodness parameter of fitted model, 
meansadjusteddeterminationcoefficient is significant, and as a result, regression is significant.Statistical 
significance means that the calculated correlation with degree of certainty is different from zero. If the 
calculated correlation coefficient is not significantly different from zero, should be assumed that there is no 
correlation between the studied variables, or the selected sample size is not large enough to show this 
correlation. It was observed that, in general, regression equation is estimable.Determination 
coefficientshows that 6% of dependent variables changes(auditquality)can be explained by independent 
variables of ownership concentration and lack of manager’s influence and other control variables, so the 
independent variables predict 6% of audit quality manager changes. 
 
Also accordance with results in table 5-4statistic value of F with Prob<0, 05 means (0, 001912) indicates 
linear regression model with95%certainty. Also nearby the statistics values of Schwartz, Byzn,Akaike and 
Hannan to each other areindicator ofthis issue that table 5-4 is the best selecting model. (Principlesrelated 
to how interpretations of the above statisticswas expressed in the third chapter). 
 
Four second hypothesisof this research was discussed in detailabout regression model (2) in Chapter 3 
and in this chapter are analyzed as follows: 
 
Table 6-2 is summarized LOGIT estimationfromeffect of measurementindexesof audit quality, lack 
ofmanagers influence, ownership concentration and auditor changein the restatement year on restatement 
of financial statements in the companies. 
 
The third hypothesis test: 
 
Statistical significant and negative correlation was found between the auditor choice with high quality 
and restatement of financial statements in the whole population in the next yearAUD and RESTATE.         
(Y1 = -0, 2717), (t =0, 0077)  
 
Therefore, H1, 3is confirmed at the significant level of 95%, or 5% error and H0, 3is rejected.Relationship 
type isnegative, therefore, it can be said: there is negative andsignificant relationship between the auditor 
choice with high quality and restatement of financial statements in the next year. 
 
The fourth hypothesis test  
 
Statistical significant correlation was not found between ownership concentration and restatement 
offinancial statementsin the whole population in the next year BLOCKand RESTATE. (Y2 = 0, 488762),    
(t =0, 4229). 
 
Therefore, H0, 4is confirmed at the significant level of 95%, or 5% error and H1, 4is rejected. It can be 
said: there isno positive and significant relationshipbetween ownership concentration and restatement of 
financial statements in the next year. 
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The fifth hypothesis test  
 
Statistical significant and negative correlation wasfound between the lack of manager’sinfluence and 
restatementof financial statements in the wholepopulationin the next year SEPCHAIRandRESTATE.          
(Y3 = -0, 206521), (t =0, 0422) Therefore, H1, 5is confirmed at the significant level of 95%, or 5% error 
and H0, 5is rejected. It can be said: There isa negative and significant relationship between the lack of 
manager’sinfluence and restatement of financial statements in the next year. 
 
The sixth hypothesis test 
 
Statistical positive and significant correlation was found between auditor change in the restatement year 
and restatement of financial statementsin the wholepopulationCHAUD and RESTATE. (Y4 =0, 06209),     
(t =0,033)  
 
Therefore, H1, 6is confirmed at the significant level of 95%, or 5% error and H0, 6is rejected. It can be 
said: There is a significant and positive relationship between auditor change in the restatement year and 
restatement of financial statements. 
 
Among other control variables, statistical significant correlation was not found with restatementof 
financial statements. 
 
These results are consistent with research in the field of restatement of financial statements in Western 
countries such as: Anderson& et al (2011), Johnlin and Ming Liu (2009), Sandeep &et al (2007), Rubin and 
Romanson (2007), Lobo & et al (2006), EmiDietmarand Mart Smith (2006), Liu Vsun (2005), Tomorrow 
&et al (2005),Agrawal and Chadha (2005), Rogondan& et al(2002), Basile (1996) and conducted researches 
in Iran by Nikbakht and Rafiee (1391),Kordestani and others (1389), Boluand others (1389) andGhorbani 
(1389). 
 
Withconsidering that the accounting information is nothing but an alternative or substitute element for 
financial phenomenon; manipulation of them allows to managementgives the desired path to the message 
which givesform topeople thought (a shareholder or investor)about operation and 
howcompanyperformance.So, in order to deal with themanagement flexibility authorities should 
giveimportance to control of quality in the audit profession in order to prevent frompurposeful restatement 
of financial statements, discovery and important distortion report in the financial statements and on the 
other hand people are given the necessary training for decision-making. 
 
Table 6-2: The relationship between restatement of financial statements with audit quality, ownership 
concentration, lack of managers influence and audit change totally 
 
Dependent Variable: RESTATE       
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing)   
Date: 08/25/15   Time: 19:33 
  
  
Sample: 1385 1392 
   
  
Included observations: 342 
  
  
Convergence achieved after 10 iterations 
 
  
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance   
Variable Coefficient Std. 
Error 
z-Statistic Prob.   
  
   
  
AUD *-0.2717 0.266362 -1.020037 0.0077 
BLOCK 0.488762 0.609842 0.801457 0.4229 
SEPCHAIR *-
0.206521 
0.293901 -0.702691 0.0422 
CHAUD *0.06209 0.294445 -0.210871 0.033 
BODINDEP 0.062404 0.071512 0.872644 0.3829 
BODSIZE -0.060724 0.236417 -0.256849 0.7973 
DIVYIELD -0.007804 0.010607 -0.735713 0.4619 
FREECF -1.90E-07 2.69E-07 -0.704565 0.4811 
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GROWCH -0.192523 0.168284 -1.144033 0.2526 
LEVERAGE -0.672854 0.558241 -1.205311 0.2281 
MARGIN 0.000624 0.006044 0.10324 0.9178 
C 0.022105 1.563908 0.014134 0.9887 
  
   
  
McFadden R-squared 0.116627     Mean dependent var 0.33918 
S.D. dependent var 0.474125     S.E. of regression 0.47724 
Akaike info criterion 1.329858     Sum squared resid 75.1594 
Schwarz criterion 1.464413     Log likelihood -215.406 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.383461 Restr. log likelihood -219.048 
LR statistic 7.284383     Avg. log likelihood -0.62984 
Prob(LR statistic) 0.045608 
  
  
  
   
  
Obs with Dep=0 226      Total obs 342 
Obs with Dep=1 116 
  
  
 
Based on the coefficients of the variables in Table 6-4 RESTATE model can be written as follows: 
That show the restatement offinancial statements relationship with audit quality, ownership 
concentration, and lack of manager’sinfluence and change Auditorin the whole populationby using following 
LOGIT regression model: 
 
RESTATE it = −0.2717AUD it + 0.488762BLOCKit − 0.206521SEPCHAIRit + 0.06209CHAUDit
+ 0.062404BODINDEPit  − 0.060724BODSIZEit − 0.007804DIVYIELDit − 1.90E
− 07FREECFit − 0.192523GROWCHit − 0.672854LEVERAGEit
+ 0.000624MARGINit + 0.022105C 
 
Mac Fadden’sdetermination coefficient model is 0,116627, therefore it can be said goodness parameter 
of fitted model, meansMac Fadden’sdetermination coefficient is significant, as a result, regression is 
significant. It was observed that, in general, regression equation can be estimated. The determination 
coefficient shows that 12% of dependent variable changes of restatement of financial statements can 
beexplained by independent variables of audit quality, ownership concentration, lack of managers influence 
and auditorchange and other control variables, so  the independent variables predict 12% of restatementof 
financial statementschanges. 
 
Also consistent with results in Table 6-4 value ofFstatistic with Prob<0, 05 mean (0, 045608) indicate 
linear regression modelwith 12% cetainty. Also nearby the statistics values of Schwartz, Byzn,Akaike and 
Hannan to each other areindicator of this issue that table 5-4 is the best selecting model. (Principlesrelated 
to how interpretations of the above statisticswas expressed in the third chapter). 
 
Research results 
 
The results indicated that investors to recognize the work quality of other audit institutionsstudied and 
evaluated tableof institutionsannual quality control on the official site of AICPA andnecessarily do not 
putexistence of concentrationin the share ownership of thecompany’s basis forauditor choose withlow 
quality in the company board.Also,investors in time of doing decisions of investmentshould be careful to 
not having two or moreside by one person in board of the company, because the influence of managers by 
having several posts in the companies is cause of occurrence ofpoor corporate governance in the company 
strategy.For example,CEO and Chairman of the board side not to be in one persontenure either CEO or 
Vice Chairman in the companiesare cause of corporate governance improvement.On the other hand,they 
examined influencing factors on the reduction of restatement of financial statements, such as audit 
institutions andtheir tenureand consider its impact on the reliability of the information provided by the 
companies and buy shares that the manipulation profit in it is less and increase possibility of profits through 
higher EPS or increasing share valuebe more. With regarding to the results is suggested that investors 
realize that necessarily ownership concentration andexistence of block shareholder in thecompany's 
stockdo not cause offuture profits report in the short term and do not have significantrelationship 
withannual adjustments in the following year. 
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Financial analysts, as well as, in analyzing time ofcompaniesfinancial statements, consideredthe amount 
of managers influence and impressionabilityof financialreporting fromtheir opportunistic behavior, and 
investigate its impact on the reliability of the information provided by the companies. 
 
In addition, investors have to consider the issue of corporate governanceand buy stock from the 
companies that corporate governance bestrong, because it would cause greater control over the 
management to prevent opportunistic behaviors. Therefore, the shareholders have more supervision on 
select new auditor when the company auditorchanged cause ofboard pressuresand in order to maintain 
auditor independence. And consider this issue thatthe large companies are less risky. 
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